Our fixation on ‘complexity’.
Why we expect the next war to be more complex than ever before.
“The key problems with modern command systems arise from a mistaken fixation on complexity. We should ignore the idea that the march of history makes conflict, war, and warfare more complex. At the very least, our ability to analyze and understand conflict is now far greater than ever before. So even if conflict has become more complex, revelling in it is a flawed approach. As we shall see, soldiers have successfully dealt with complexity for generations.” – Jim Storr in ‘Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century’[1]
In this post, I want to highlight one of the points Jim makes on what he describes as one of the key problems with modern command systems, namely that they arise from a mistaken fixation on complexity. [2] I have heard the argument all too often: the upcoming wars will be more complex than ever before. This complexity is mainly being used as a catch-all phrase to describe things that we do not fully understand yet or that we are unfamiliar with.
First, what is meant by complexity? The dictionary gives us the following definition of something being ‘complex’:
Composed of many interconnected parts; compound; composite:
Characterized by a very complicated or involved arrangement of parts, units, etc.:
So complicated or intricate as to be hard to understand or deal with, as in a complex problem. [3]
There are likely many more elaborate definitions possible; yet the three definitions mentioned above cover it for the most part. Let’s look at each one of them.
Storr provides two explanations for the apparent lack of complexity in previous wars. His first explanation is that we always look back at them, thereby already knowing the outcome and being able to imagine a simple causal chain. This likely didn’t seem that simple or familiar at the time, though. Second, by using a historiographic lens, we hide the complexity and create a simplified and coherent summary. Historians may, for example, compress years of wars involving millions of people into one book. [4] Another explanation can be added to these two, which is that these events are often described as mere rational facts, as if the war could be compared with the subsequent moves in a game of chess. Yet every decision, from the lowest to the highest level of command, is fraught with social relations that are impossible to describe accurately, even for the people involved at that time, let alone some historian years after the event. In other words, the actual situation is more complex than historic summaries tend to show, obviously. For example, soldiers do not automatically follow orders; they need leaders they trust. Staffs at command posts are not necessarily effective teams, capable of understanding the battlefield and creating realistic and timely plans. Some historians do attempt to describe these social relations, but it is an impossible task when you want to draw conclusions on large formations with large numbers of people involved. To conclude, from afar, the previous war may seem simple, but back then it was (also) likely conceived as being complex.
Besides the historic explanations mentioned above, there is another explanation for why future wars are especially expected to be more complex: unfamiliarity. We do not always know when, where, against whom, and with what the next war will be fought. What we currently see is a lot of new technology emerging, some of which are unfamiliar and rapidly evolving (e.g., AI). We all get a sense that this will likely have some application on the future battlefield, and we already see some minor applications being used.[5] Although these new technologies can possibly have large effects on the future, they do not necessarily need to add to the perceived complexity. Complexity is relative in that it depends on your current knowledge or insight into the matter. In the words of Storr: insight is what allows complex things to be perceived as simple. [6] The third definition of ‘complex’: so complicated or intricate as to be hard to understand or deal with, as in a complex problem, is therefore relative and fortunately solvable.
One can argue that the first and second definitions of ‘complex’ as in the amount of ‘interconnected parts’ or ‘involved arrangement of parts’ have increased substantially. We are fighting in more domains (eg. space and cyber) than we did previously and have substantially more diverse technology and equipment at our disposal. Especially in higher echelons there will likely be an increase in the amount of ‘interconnected parts’. Sometimes new subject matter experts are needed to handle them, but not necessarily. When some new or different task is added to a unit or staff, we tend to solve this problem by appointing a new staff member, thereby enlarging our HQ’s or units and reinforcing the idea that since we need this many experts, our jobs clearly have become more complex. Storr argues that sometimes these new jobs are invented or created in order to keep people in jobs. The current officers in the HQ can likely execute these tasks as well. [7] Another angle would be that the number of parts has increased. Many of these parts, as in units, are much more interconnected and thereby easier(?) to command or control. Does this make it more complex? One thing is for sure, if we simply look at the number of people and units involved, then World War II was definitely more complex than any battle we could envision fighting with our current numbers.
Storr is optimistic: Complexity is manageable. Over time people learn a set of ‘known’ outcomes to a given complex situation. Clausewitz considered that the one factor that can help an army in such circumstances is experience. Experience of unfamiliar circumstances leads to familiarity.[8] I agree with Storr, complexity is manageable, and we should not revel in its supposed inevitability. Every war has likely been perceived as complex at the outset. What we should focus on is training with unfamiliar circumstances. Defining something as being complex tells you more about yourself than it does about that which is being perceived as complex.
[1] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P8
[2] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P8
[3] Dictionary.com
[4] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P35, quoted
[5] https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/03/israel-ai-warfare-gaza-00144491
[6] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P35.
[7] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P128.
[8] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P34.
Picture: https://images.pixexid.com
I am a big fan of Clausewitz’s observation that war is simple and the simplest things are very complex. It’s an apparent paradox with which I’m very comfortable but then I don’t have to do anything more than sit in a comfortable chair and read about it (or occasionally study how it is reflected in the war game I’m learning to play). I wonder if mastery of a particular form of war, or long experience in a particular time and place provides sufficient familiarity to make it seem simple? Which simplicity is then lost when one or other sides introduces a new weapon or a novel tactic with an old weapon?