Sharpening our Military Command, Part I
Why we need faster and shorter orders.
“Give me six hours to chop down a tree and I will spend the first four sharpening the axe.” - Abraham Lincoln
If we want to win the next war, we must above all be smarter. One of the most crucial elements in need of improvement is our command and control, or more concretely, our command systems. In this post, I will look into some of the deficiencies of Western Land Command systems, relying for a large part on the work of Jim Storr as described in his brilliant book, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century. Trying to fix this problem is important, since we have seen that especially command posts have been vulnerable in the current war in Ukraine.[1] Since lately, there seems to be less reporting on command posts being destroyed. However, this might be related to the fact that the war is far from being mobile, whereas command posts (CP) are most vulnerable, but simultaneously most crucial, during a manoeuvre warfare.
Storr explains that there are three main problems with our command systems: Modern HQ are too big, the orders they produce are too long and they take too long to produce them.[2] My personal experience working in a Brigade HQ align with these observations. Fortunately there are some officers that recognize these problems and advocate and implement changes. However, in general these problems are still not always being acknowledged or taken seriously enough. So what should change? The observations Storr makes in his book lead him to six premises (quote):
- the amount of information actually used to make battlefield decisions is, in practice, very small.
- operation orders should be, can be and have been very short.
- the staffs actually needed to produce those orders are very small.
- there is significant military advantage in making and disseminating decisions much faster than at present.
- decisions and operations orders, do not have to be as good if they are produced significantly faster.
- there are significant advantages in deploying smaller command posts.[3]
What we can learn from the past: faster and shorter orders
Storr gives a number of analogies to command systems in the second world war, where staffs and command posts were much smaller. The order for operation Overlord, the largest Allied operation during the second world war, consisted of only a few pages. Compare that with orders written during the NATO HQ in Iraq and Afghanistan, that could easily number 750 pages.[4] Yet far more interesting is the example of the Wehrmacht during the second world war. “Practically all orders at divisional level and below were given orally: often over the telephone. In some divisions, written orders were forbidden. Short orders were the norm even early in the war. If anything, they got even shorter.” During the invasion of France in 1940 the German High Command had to order two Army Groups to change direction, one withdrawing and one relieving another Army Group. This order was five pages long and had three annexes.[5] Storr describes how the Germans write their orders: “German wartime practise had numbered, but untitled, paragraphs. The format was quite flexible. The number of paragraphs varied, and often there was no formal mission statement. The overall effect was that of a continuous narrative.”[6]
General Hermann Balck: “Don’t work hard, work fast.”
Why did they not need more words to describe their plans? One of the possible explanations is that the units knew what was to be expected of them and needed fewer guidance than we currently do. Orders should not prescribe how units ought to conduct tactical operations or activities that are part of the standing doctrine. Another explanation is that we have less confidence in our sub-ordinates nowadays and want to exercise more control over their actions. Control measures in a sense mostly describe what we ‘don’t want our subordinates to do’. Another observation is that output mattered more than process. The fact that the format and the number of paragraphs were flexible possibly added to writing down only that which is necessary. Nowadays we have superb formats from which we are not allowed to deviate. The result is that we fill the format, even though nothing relevant is being said at the specific paragraph. I am also tempted to conclude that these formats also have a negative effect on the messaging of the order itself. Our brains better absorb a narrative, as in a story. That is why we like to brief the operation supported by a maquette (model) or map, as if it were a film. Formats per definition hinder the creation of a narrative.
Another critique made by Storr is that there is little need for contingency planning when command systems are capable of deciding and acting quickly on changing circumstances. Although he also acknowledges that there might be situations were such plans can be useful. Storr gives the example of the British 1st Armoured Division HQ in 1991 which crossed the line of departure for Operation Desert Storm with about 70 contingency plans from headquarters VII (US) Corps. Not one of them was executed as planned or even referred to during actual contingency planning.[7] There are many more of such examples, but you can imagine how these plans add to the absurd number of pages and annexes.
However..
A counter-argument for why we nowadays need larger or more detailed orders is that we have less tolerance for casualties, especially those incurred by blue on blue (ie. when you accidently shoot on your own troops). Take for example the German command practice in the second world war, as described above. It is likely that the Germans (or Allies) incurred a much higher rate of casualties and had a different stance towards such casualties. I cannot support this hypothesis with data, and I am sceptical whether this data is available. Yet, it is a plausible explanation for why our orders have become more detailed and elaborate, especially during operations such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan were the general acceptance of casualties was much lower than during Large Scale Conflict Operations (LSCO). One can even argue that comparing command systems from the second world war with those of the past twenty years is faulty. What this argument does show is that when we need prepare for LSCO again, we need to change our command systems and the output they produce as well. For LSCO will likely resemble many characteristics of the second world war, or even the first world war when you look at what is happening in Ukraine.
How?
The obvious answer to the problems mentioned above is training, albeit different training. We tend to focus on processes and we certify our troops on how good they have managed the process. There is too little emphasis on actual output. During more than one command staff training I have personally witnessed that the explicit goal of the exercise was to train the process, ‘output was not relevant’. Most importantly, “Commanders and their staff should learn not just how to take part but how to win. There is very little point in doing exercises where the enemy is not adversarial and evolutionary; nor where the exercise play does not become complex and verge on the chaotic.”[8] Training should not focus on the command staff but especially on the interplay between command staff (posts) and their subordinate units. We all know examples of very well trained rifle squads that need few words to communicate in the heat of battle. They know what is intended and what is expected of each member during a specific tactical activity. They can become especially proficient when they train against adversaries that force them to adapt on the spot. We all understand this when it comes to rifle squads, but we find it difficult to extrapolate this to larger units. Size matters, and it is fair to say that larger formations are more complex, but this does not make it impossible. Complexity is solvable (see my earlier post on complexity), mainly by becoming familiar with each other, our adversary and our environment. This requires extensive amounts of training.
Nonetheless, it is better to sharpen the axe while we can, and be able to cut it down 3 times as fast when the time comes to chopping down trees. Let’s sharpen our command systems.
This post will be one of several upcoming posts on command systems. Future parts will focus for example on the size of command posts and the possible trade-off between command post effectiveness and survivability.
[1] https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2023/12/07/us-army-moves-to-mobilize-and-disperse-its-increasingly-vulnerable-command-posts/
[2] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P5
[3] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P8
[4] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P3
[5] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P52
[6] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P69
[7] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P69
[8] Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st Century, P34
Bibliography:
Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st century (Hampshire: Howgate Publishing Limited, 2022)
Picture: https://magazines.defensie.nl/landmacht/2018/08/05_innovatie_commandovering_08-2018