“Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the latter than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never.” Napoleon Bonaparte
This post will be about the most valuable resource of military operations, time. Armies often speak of the triad of Time-Space-Force.[1] These are the most crucial variables that need to be taken into account when planning or conducting (large scale) combat operations. So why would time be more valuable than space or force? The quote at the top of this post tells it all, we cannot recover time whereas we can recover space or renew our forces. I will first explore the concept of time in the military domain and especially at the more strategic level. Next, I will explain how we can use time to our advantage at the tactical level, specifically when it comes to military decision-making.
When planning military operations, the use of time is crucial, but we nonetheless often focus on space and force. Time is a constant factor and we cannot influence the passage of time. The only thing we can do is make better use of it, be it by using less time for activities, or by letting more time pass as a consequence of activities such as a delay in defensive operations. Space and force on the contrary can themselves be manipulated and are therefore much more versatile. We can for example decide to act in a certain area or avoid other parts. We can also change the environment by digging anti-tank ditches or by flooding certain parts of the terrain, a technique known as inundation. Forces can also be very versatile since you can change the order of battle or the way you deploy your troops or certain weapon systems. When creating courses of action (COA), time sometimes seems more of a constraint and we take little time to see how we can use time to our advantage or change it into a disadvantage to the enemy. Time can also be an objective in itself, for example when you have to delay the enemy advance for at least 48 hours in order to enable reserve forces to execute a counter-attack. Time is also being used as an objective factor that nobody possesses. Take for example the use of the phrase that ‘time is currently on the side of Russia in war in Ukraine’, as if time is choosing sides.[2]
Physics would tell you that time is relative, whereas we often experience it as being a constant.[3] We can actually experience these effects of relativity when you travel at very high altitudes or high speeds, but these effects are only very small, yet large enough to influence your GPS.[4] Large changes in time are only possible when you either introduce a very large mass (M) or travel at very high speeds (v), which makes it very difficult to change time itself here on earth other than in a particle accelerator. Although we cannot change time itself, we can change how we view the concept of time.
Changing the concept of time: strategic level.
David Kilcullen explains in his book, The Dragons and the Snakes: how the rest learned how to fight the West, that the Dragons (eg. China) have learned how to change the concept of time. Kilcullen calls this Liminal Warfare. Liminal warfare is about threshold manipulation. Especially the Russians excel in this type of warfare, which is ‘about riding the edge of observability, surfing the threshold of detectability so a lot of their activity is literally sub-liminal (“below the threshold” of perception)’.[5] [6] Kilcullen explains that one can also make use of horizontal escalation, meaning that you expand the geography, categories and scope of actions, with or without increasing intensity in one location. This is a form of conceptual envelopment wherein China is for example already engaging the Western nations, without them really identifying this as a threat, let alone a hostile engagement. This means that conceptually, China is already making proper use of time. War does not start at day one of the official and formal declaration of war.[7] If you want to buy time, you can best do this by extending your concept of when conflict starts. This is of course not entirely new, long before the start of World War I most European Nations were already building up their armies. The difference now is that with this strategy of liminal warfare, you already start imposing effects on your adversary, before the actual start of war. Which raises the question of when war actually starts.
Kilcullen also explains that these liminal operations themselves have a temporal dimension. Kilcullen: “Once an adversary’s response time and reaction time are identified, forces can calculate the time window available – to achieve an objective before a response can occur, render that response ineffective, or prevent it altogether.”[8] The enemy reaction time consists of the time needed to detect, attribute and decide to act, followed by the time needed to mount and launch a response. By that time, the liminal operation has already disappeared under the threshold towards ambiguity. Important to note is that Kilcullen acknowledges that decision making will require most of the reaction time. A possible example of such a liminal operation would be the sabotage act of the Nordstream gas pipelines in the Baltic sea at the 26th of September 2022. Although these sabotage acts were likely not executed by Russia, the actor still made use of this principle.[9]
How we use time is determined by how we conceptually view events like war and conflict, and these concepts can be stretched and thus used advantageously. This conceptual envelopment is mostly a strategic game. At the tactical level, time can also make the difference between winning battles or losing them.
The value of time: tactical level
We cannot influence the flow of time itself directly, yet we can influence space and forces in such a way that the adversary will need more time to achieve their goals. For example, when we create an obstacle barrier or mine field, we change the environment and limit the use of space by our adversaries. The use of time by forces can also be influenced by degrading for example their mobility (eg. destroying fuel resources), but also by weakening their morale, leaving them less capable of quick decision-making. This is sometimes also described as ‘getting inside the adversaries OODA-loop’, meaning that you are able to make decisions quicker than your adversary.[10] I have written a lengthy article with the title: ‘How to think and act faster than the enemy’, which describes how we can make these decisions more quickly relative to the our adversaries.
Being faster is the effect, the goal is to be less dependant on time. The best way to describe what I mean is by the analogy with long range strike capabilities. It requires no further explanation that every commander wants to be able to project firepower over increasingly larger distances, especially relative to your adversary. A HIMARS system can possibly fire missiles up to 500km, but it can also fire at targets much closer.[11] You want to have the capability to project firepower, but that doesn’t mean that you will always use it at the maxim range. Now look at military decision-making, or more specifically command posts. Instead of increasing range you want to achieve the inverse, requiring increasingly less time to achieve the same effects. We take this into account when we design new weapon systems, like when it takes less time to reload a weapon system. We should continuously strive to do the same when it comes to decision-making and deploying and operating our command posts. You don’t always need to strike at 500km, but you want to have the ability to do so. The same is true with making decisions, you want to be able to make decisions very quickly while retaining the possibility to think and plan thoroughly when time is available. Time is not a given, we can to a certain extent choose how we make use of it.
Command posts should strive to do everything in as little time as possible. Of course, the same principle holds for units that actually have to conduct the tactical activities. My hypothesis is, based upon logic and my personal experiences, that most time can be won in accelerating our military decision making and less so in the performance of actual tactical activities. Moreover, tactical activities like moving troops from one location to another or conducting an attack, are bound by physical laws.[12] There are limits on how fast you can fly, drive or fare without it becoming impractical for battle. Getting to decisions in the first place is where we can most easily win time. The difficult part is that it involves changing one’s mindset and perhaps even culture.
To give you one example. A year ago, one Infantry Brigade command post experimented with exactly this idea, reducing the time to get to an order down to only a couple of hours. This meant that certain steps in the format for decision-making, in this case TPLF (Tactical Planning for Land Forces)[13] were less detailed or skipped altogether. Some were very enthusiastic about the experiment, others were sceptical. One of the arguments against such experiments was that command posts and their sub-ordinate troops should first be proficient in the original format for TPLF before being able to responsibly take short-cuts. Arguing that you must first learn to walk before trying to run. This is a valid argument, but also one that is flawed. However, you can also argue that it is not about the speed you have, but the route you take. If you take a much shorter route you don’t need to run, you can arrive at the finish line faster despite walking a slower pace. Actually, you should do both, taking a shorter route and learning how to run. This is what I attempt to achieve with my proposed decision-making model called PAIM (predict, act, indicate, model) as a modification to the well-known OODA-loop.[14] For more details, follow this link. Now this is just one possible solution, but my point is that we can and ought to decrease the amount of time needed for military decision-making. To conclude, we can either do the things we already do faster, or we can intentionally alter or skip certain elements of the process, thereby winning time.
“A good solution applied with vigor now is better than a perfect solution ten minutes later” General George S. Patton, Jr. War As I Knew it, 1947
There are numerous historic examples which show that time can make a huge difference in wars. The prime example is the German offensive Fall Gelb in 1940, in which they invaded the Low-Countries and France with such speed that the allies were simply overwhelmed. German General H. Guderian gave a superb intent to his troops: “three days to get to the river Muse, and on the fourth day, we cross it”.[15] [16] This intent says it all, speed and winning time are essential. Such high-tempo operations had the Soviets in World War II conclude that: “a force which acted twice as fast, was five times as effective”.[17] Luckily for us, and especially the Ukrainians at the moment, the Russians did not sufficiently learn from history, or else are incapable of implementing these lessons adequately at the moment. The question is, how well have Western armies learnt these lessons about the importance of time?
To conclude this post, I want to share a story from Winston Churchill concerning the battle of Gallipoli, which may be very apt when we look at the current war of attrition in Ukraine and the importance of time from both a strategic and more tactical point of view:
“FORCE and TIME in this kind of operation amount to almost the same thing, and each can to a very large extent be expressed in terms of each other. A week lost was about the same as a division. Three divisions in February could have occupied the Gallipoli Peninsula with little fighting. Five could have captured it after March 18th. Seven were insignificant at the end of April, but nine just might have done it. Eleven might have sufficed at the beginning of July. Fourteen were to prove insufficient on August 7th.” Sir Winston S. Churchill, Of the Gallipoli Campaign in 1915 [18]
[1] Space: environment, Force: all the troops and means available to achieve an effect.
[2] https://mondediplo.com/2024/10/01russia-ukraine
[3] Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time, P22
[4] GPS: Global Positioning System
[5] https://smallwarsjournal.com/2020/05/26/liminal-and-conceptual-envelopment-warfare-age-dragons/
[6] David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest learned to fight the West, P150
[7] David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest learned to fight the West, P175
[8] David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest learned to fight the West, P158
[9] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/qa-what-is-known-about-nord-stream-gas-pipeline-explosions-2023-09-26/
[10] OODA: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. A model for (military) decision-making created by John Boyd.
[11] HIMARS: High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
[12] One can argue that decision making is also bound by physical laws
[13] NATO Doctrine, APP-28
[14] How to think and act faster than the enemy | Militaire Spectator
[15] https://www.warhistoryonline.com/instant-articles/german-breakthrough-at-sedan.html
[16] Netherlands Armed Forces Staff College Battlefield tour at Sedan, France, 2024
[17] Notes from a briefing of a British Officer in Moscow in 1990, Source: Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st, P86
[18] Peter G Souras, The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, P479
Image: created with DALL-E (AI)
Bibliography:
- Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam Books, 1988)
- David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest learned to fight the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020)
- Peter G Souras, The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations (London: Greenhill Books, 2000)
- Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21st century (Hampshire: Howgate Publishing Limited, 2022)
I have always paid attention to and tried to emulate lazy people who are endeavoring to get the job done with less effort and often less time