The transparent battlefield.
How to deal with the problem of being (always) visible on the battlefield.
A currently much discussed problem within many Armed Forces is the effect of drones on the battlefield. The reports and news coming from the battlefield in Ukraine are disturbing. One of the main problems identified is that it becomes increasingly difficult to hide your formations, or even single units or vehicles, and thus achieve surprise. Moreover, due to the fast targeting cycles you risk getting fired upon, sometimes within minutes.[1] This becomes all the more problematic since the range of fire support systems has increased. These activities are not new and are known to us as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Targeting. The difference now is (1) the availability at a low tactical level, (2) the numbers (mass) in which they are used, (3) the speed by which they are employed and ISR is being used for targeting and (4) the speed of the evolution of drones and their counter-measures such as jamming. Despite the focus on drones in reporting on the war in Ukraine, we should not forget that space satellites and electronic surveillance also increasingly contribute to the high visibility of units and formations on the battlefield. One could therefore argue that the battlefield has become transparent.
This is not an entirely new problem, hiding your intentions and forces has always been important. We just have to be (more) aware that this specific problem is also part of the continuous arms-race that we are already familiar with in other fields of warfare, such as missiles and their counter-measures. One of the tactical counter-measures being implemented is the need to become more dispersed, thereby limiting the effects of enemy artillery. Yet we do not need to rely solely on technology or becoming increasingly more dispersed. Being visible is not always a problem, it can even be used to your advantage. In order to demonstrate, I will make the analogy with the game of chess.
In chess, you can oversee the entire environment and every piece on the chessboard. You know that the environment only comes in two flavors, black and white, which is a whole lot simpler than our real-life battlefields. Moreover, you know what the capabilities are of each piece and you can always observe their current position. With this information, you can anticipate at least a couple of moves ahead. However, for those who have played chess, you will likely have experienced that you can still be surprised and out-maneuvered. Not just sometimes, almost always, be it as the winner or loser. What matters is not only how many steps ahead you can calculate. [2] What really matters is that you understand the intentions of your opponent. That means that you have to deduce and subsequently predict his or her intentions by looking at the configuration and the movement of pieces on the board. It is relevant that you need to be able to see the entire chess board and its progress, not just one piece, in order to understand the intentions of your opponent. On the actual battlefield, you need to integrate the information from all your different sensors on the battlefield when you want to be able to explain what you see. The quick and direct targeting that forces are now experiencing in Ukraine is of course a huge problem for those on the ground, but it is mainly so because the front is static at the moment. It is unlikely that this tactic will be decisive. When compared with chess, it is as if you only focus on taking as many pieces of your opponent as possible, without trying to actually checkmating him or her. This strategy is called attrition in warfare. The best chess players however do not pursue this strategy, only beginners or those who see or have no alternative.
What can we learn from chess? Although these lessons are obvious, when they are carefully examined I conclude that armies do not apply them at their full potential. The first lesson is that we need to think multiple steps ahead and incorporate (counter) reactions of the enemy, not only at the start of the game, but especially when the battle (game) evolves. Most of the time, armies make detailed plans of upcoming operations and rely on mission command and leadership during the battle. It is enormously difficult to achieve an overall picture on the evolving battlefield due to the fog of war and simply because too many pieces have started moving. This is what makes it so difficult to understand the intentions of the enemy once the battle has started. Although there will be many more sensors on the battlefield of tomorrow, I expect that the enemy (and we ourselves) will still experience problems with integrating and explaining what we observe. These many sensors are like a microscope, they enlarge the small things on the battlefield but are not capable of understanding the bigger picture. Technology has not been able to deliver us this last piece of the puzzle (yet) and I expect that for the time being we will be reliant on people for integrating, explaining and understanding this bigger picture.
The second lesson is that we can also exploit this visibility in order to deceive the enemy. These are called a demonstration or feint in military tactics. One can choose to show only those elements that you want to show the enemy, for example specific units or a specific signature in the electromagnetic spectrum. As with with chess, it takes experience and practice to become creative and able to deceive your opponent.
A third lesson, in line with the second lesson, is that we need to try to achieve surprise at other levels than mere formations or the positions of units. We can for example hide certain capabilities of our weapon systems, yet this often only works once. You can also perform tactical maneuvers differently than what doctrine prescribes. As if you introduce a new piece on the chess board, disguise it as a mere pawn, or have it perform moves that it wasn’t allowed to do so originally.
Intelligence officers often analyze the enemy by looking at their intentions, capabilities and (previous) activities. Even when you know the capabilities and current activities of your enemy, you can still be erroneous when it concerns their intentions. In chess, looking at the pieces moving at the chessboard will not automatically result in understanding the intentions of your enemy. For that, you need to view the entirety of the game and try to get inside the head of your enemy. You need to hide your own intentions and uncover those of your enemy.
To conclude, we need to adapt to the ever growing visibility on the battlefield, but we do not need to fear it. Instead, we need to become more creative in hiding our intentions and uncovering those of our opponent.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/DRONES/dwpkeyjwkpm/
[2] Computers like Deep Blue can calculate so many steps ahead that it beats even the best human opponent. Yet does this computer really understand the intentions of its opponent? This would also be an interesting analogy to make, perhaps for a future Post on Substack.
Picture 1: AI creation by Freepik.com
Picture 2: Photo by Felix Mittermeier on Unsplash