War = Problem Solving
War = Problem Solving
War is about solving problems, and simultaneously creating problems for your adversary.
War is said to be a contest of wills. Some say it is an art, others say it is a science. I think that it can be all of them at once. However, I would like to propose another way how to view war. War is about solving problems, and simultaneously creating problems for your adversary. The physicist David Deutsch in his book, The Beginning of Infinity, describes what he thinks is the essential approach we should take towards both understanding and shaping our world. There are two maxims, he points out, that we ought to carve into stone:
“problems are inevitable”
“problems are soluble”
Deutsch: “It is inevitable that we face problems, but no particular problem is inevitable. We survive, thrive, by solving each problem as it comes up. And, since the human ability to transform nature is limited only by the laws of physics, none of the endless stream of problems will ever constitute an impassable barrier.” By soluble, it is meant that with the right knowledge we can solve these problems. This does not mean that we have this knowledge always available to us, but it is in principle accessible to us.[1]
Military operations can be viewed as problems that need to be solved. Problem solving literally means ‘the process or act of finding a solution to a problem’.[2] Armies can solve problems at different levels of complexity with different kinds of urgency. The crew of a tank will have little time to think and act when it is being engaged by enemy fire. It will need to rely on tactical procedures that have been drilled endlessly, in order to ‘solve the problem of an enemy target’ as fast and efficiently as possible. In scenarios like these it is advantageous to have solutions at hand. Where problem-solving really becomes a relevant strategy is when your armies, like the Ukrainians and Russians at the moment, become bogged down in a static front line with few options to outmanoeuvre or outsmart the adversary. Yet one can argue that an infantry platoon that is about to clear an urban area also needs to solve the problem of clearing houses with as few casualties as possible.
One can argue that most problems are too big for tactical units, and that actual problem solving only takes place at the operational level, like NATO’s Land Component Command (LCC). However, problems can and should be translated to all (tactical) levels. Moreover, tactical units will experience problems at their own level. Just like the tank crew that needs to solve the problem of incoming enemy fire.
Hammer-nail solutions.
Although this may sound all too obvious at a first glance, it negates strategies that relegate war to either something entirely scientific that mirrors an algorithm as in ‘when X, then do Y’, or something that relies on art solely, like the intuitions of one brilliant military commander. Viewing military operations through the lens of ‘problem-solving’ forces you to define and investigate the problem and look for solutions that fit. But if your only tool is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail.
Because of our extensive training and reliance on tactical procedures and planning, armed forces have a tendency to see problems as nails. We often forget to actually analyse the problem that needs to be solved. This is partly due to the nature or formulation of the missions given to us by one-up, which limit our options and force us to perform specific tasks. Western armies are being trained to make use of doctrines that describe specific types of operations or task-verbs. These are important because they function as models that provide a unity of understanding for all troops involved in the operation. What they also provide is hammer-nail solutions. Solutions that are very useful when creating a course of action under stressful and time compressed circumstances.
Solving and creating problems.
However, a smart adversary will try to solve the problems it faces while simultaneously imposing problems on your forces that cannot easily be solved by your standard doctrinal manoeuvres. This is exactly what we see in the evolution of asymmetric warfare or insurgencies. It is a constant reaction and counter-reaction of both sides. David Kilcullen explains this classical wartime coevolution by describing what happened years ago (and possibly again now) in South Lebanon: “When Israel and the SLA[3] employed fixed outposts, Hezbollah launched frontal assaults. When Israel reinforced the outposts in response, Hezbollah switched to mortar and rocket fire. When Israel forces again changed their tactics, getting out on the ground and employing more mobile forces to reduce the impact of mortars and rockets, Hezbollah responded with ambushes and IEDs and acquired advanced missile systems. Likewise, when the IDF[4] employed sniffer dogs to discover wire triggered bombs, Hezbollah answered by hiding IEDs inside fibreglass rocks and sued radio control to set off the bombs.”[5] Kilcullen continues to elaborate on the evolution of this conflict, but you probably get the point. Note that this example is strikingly similar to what NATO experienced while fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Kilcullen explains that insurgencies excel in adapting to a changing battlefield because they are forced to do so in order to survive, more so than their opponents that consist of conventional forces.[6] Although Kilcullen speaks of evolution and not in terms of ‘problem-solving’, we can conclude that insurgents are overall better problem-solvers than conventional forces. One possible explanation for this is that conventional armies have been moulded by years of training and doctrinal indoctrination with strict hierarchies and career paths, in contrary to the average insurgency group. Most importantly, conventional forces initially always have the upper hand in counter-insurgencies by having larger numbers, thereby likely making them feel less pressure to adapt, whereas a small group of insurgents needs to adapt or risk becoming extinct. This is also an explanation for why armies can lapse so easily into a war of attrition. Don’t get me wrong, all wars involve attrition to some degree.
In the beginning of the war in Ukraine, it were the Ukrainian Armed Forces that were able to adapt best, whereas the Russians struggled to cope with the unforeseen opposition. The Kursk offensive two years later is one example of how Ukraine surprised the Russians and tried to create a new problem for the Russian Armed Forces. It seems that the entire offensive function was just that, to create a new problem for Russia, forcing them to commit troops that were needed elsewhere. The offensive also demonstrated to Ukraine’s Western Allies that Ukraine was still able to achieve successes on the battlefield and surprise the Russians.[7] Recently however, it seems that the Russians are becoming more adaptive than the Ukrainians, as Mick Ryan explains in an article in Foreign Affairs.[8] It is crucial that Ukraine increases the speed at which it deploys adaptations in order to inflict as much damage as possible before Russia learns how to react.
As the examples have shown above, it is more important to be adaptive quickly. Unlike a game of chess, it is not so much about a reaction and counter-reaction but about how to change the rules of the game by introducing new pieces with new abilities or by extending the playing field (ie. creating problems), or by adapting to situations when your adversary is changing the rules of the game (ie. solving problems). We can call this adaptiveness, or we can call this problem solving. Problem solving presumes that there is a novel problem for which there is no solution yet, and therefore it is ineffective or useless to grab for a hammer. War is therefore about solving problems, and simultaneously creating problems for your adversary.
[1] P64 David D
[2] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/problem-solving
[3] South Lebanon Army
[4] Israeli Defence Forces
[5] David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest learned to fight the West, P107
[6] David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest learned to fight the West
[7] https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-kursk-offensive-how-ukraines-operational-level-guerrilla-warfare-is-bringing-maneuver-back/
[8] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russias-adaptation-advantage
Image: AI generated on StockCake
Bibliography:
- David Deutsch. The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations that Transform the World (London: Pengiun Books, 2012)
- David Kilcullen, The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest learned to fight the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020)