How do we know what to look for and what to discard? Where do conspiracy theorists go wrong?
The philosopher Karl Popper argued that theory always has to come before observation. Somewhere in 1926, Popper used to begin his lecture on the philosophy of science by asking the students simply to ‘observe’. He would then wait in silence for one of the students to ask what they were supposed to observe. By doing this, he demonstrated one of the many flaws of empiricism (and induction). Popper would go on to explain that scientific observations are impossible without pre-existing knowledge about what to look for, what to look at, how to look, and finally how to interpret what one observes. Therefore, theory has to come first. It has to be conjectured first, not derived from observations.[1] [2]
But where do these conjectures or theories come from? David Deutsch makes a wonderful case for this in his book ‘the Fabric of Reality’. Deutsch prefers the term ‘explanation’ instead of conjecture or theory, but they can be more or less used interchangeably. Deutsch explains that the term ‘explanation’ is roughly speaking about ‘why’ rather than ‘what’. He goes on and I quote:
explanations are … about the inner workings of things; about how things really are, rather than what merely happens to be so; about what must be so, rather than what merely happens to be so; about laws of nature rather than rules of thumb. They are also about coherence, elegance and simplicity, as opposed to arbitrariness and complexity, though none of those things is easy to define either. But in any case, understanding is one of the higher functions of the human mind and brain, and a unique one. Many other physical systems, such as animals’ brains, computers and other machines, can assimilate facts and act upon them. But at present we know of nothing that is capable of understanding an explanation – or of wanting one in the first place – other than a human mind. Every discovery of a new explanation, and every act of grasping an existing explanation, depends on the uniquely human faculty of creative thought.[3]
The difference is that you do not create thousands of explanations that are equally possible, but you continually out-argue, refute and abandon them. A good explanation, Deutsch argues, is hard to vary. Deutsch: one is not struggling to distinguish between countless different explanations of nearly equal merit; typically, one is struggling to create even one good explanation, and, having succeeded, one is glad to be rid of the rest. This aspect of being ‘hard to vary’ is crucial. It means that the variables cannot easily be interchanged for something else.
As an example I can recall a discussion I once had with a conspiracy fanatic. This person claimed that the world leaders must be plotting something evil at the Bilderberger conference each year. I asked him why he thought so and he replied that no journalists were allowed inside. The only possible explanation for him was therefore that these leaders were plotting something evil. Of course, this explanation can be varied enormously. Perhaps, I claimed, these world leaders had a secret ritual of eating pancakes while dancing around naked, which would also explain why they would not like journalists around. More importantly, I can come up with a thousand other equally possible but absurd explanations.[4] The point here is that there is only one explanation that will fit all observations and pass the tests as well as the attempts to falsify the explanation. In that case there is little to none variation possible.
A more relevant example is the theory of evolution. There are still some explanatory gaps within the theory, but it is overall a very good explanation for how live came into being and ‘evolved’. Richard Dawkins makes a comparison of the explanation of evolution with that of creationism by analogue of a mountain, which he calls ‘mount improbable’. At the left side of the mountain, you can see a slope that rises to the top. This signifies the gradual ascent of explanations and accumulation of evidence for reaching the summit of the mountain: complex life forms that inhabit our planet today. At the right side of the mountain there is no gradual slope, but instead a steep cliff.[5] This is the creationist explanation of complex life, namely that a God created it. Just this one big variable that can explain everything. But why not interchange God with The Flying Spaghetti Monster? There is no reason why The Flying Spaghetti Monster explanation would be any different. But the explanation that something or someone created everything in a couple of days out of nothing requires numerous other explanations, and more importantly, leaves room for many more variations. This is also what we observe. There are many different ‘creationist’ versions within one religion, let alone between different religions. The theory of evolution on the other hand itself evolves and becomes increasingly good at explaining itself. The scientific community may have some discussions about different aspects of evolution, but these discussions are steadily eliminated and superseded by new and better explanations. Simultaneously new problems are being raised that require an explanation. Hence the gradual slope that becomes smoother every day we make scientific progress, in contrast to the insurmountable cliff side of the mountain which requires a ‘leap of faith’. I’d personally rather have some firm footing while trying to reach the summit.
To summarize, you need to create good explanations that are hard to vary. But good explanations do not come out of nowhere. A good dose of creativity will definitely help you along and it will of course require some intellectual traits that not all people are equally equipped with. Yet essentially you will need to have some knowledge or points of reference to start with. The recurring theme here is that knowledge does not come out of nowhere. Induction can’t work without an explanation (theory), you need knowledge of where and what to look for. But then again, you also need ‘some’ knowledge to create an explanation, and therefore observations as in induction. Just as with a deduction, your conclusion is as valuable as the premises it is built on. If one of the premises is false, the conclusion will be false as well. You can then try to analyze the premise and find out that it too is built upon some form of knowledge. Eventually you will either stop at some assumption or at some observation.
That is why you are likely not born with innate explanations of how the world works. A baby just starts observing, perhaps even in the womb already, and many of the early theories will perhaps solely rely on induction. That is why very young children for example do not understand that when you hide the toy behind a box, that the toy is likely still there but just out of view. Nor will it at a very young age have conceived of a theory that a ball that rolls behind a box will likely continue to roll and reappear on the other side of the box. How do children then construct these theories? I think it is most likely only induction, or in the words of David Hume, nothing more than ‘custom’. When it becomes a toddler it will start asking a lot of ‘why’ questions since the child wants to make sense of its observations.
When we grow older, we lose the need to create explanations and resort to custom (as in the words of David Hume). Most of us have become either lazy or too self-confident and simply assume. What we ought to do is ask more often ‘why’ and ‘how’ and look for an explanation that is hard to vary.
[1] Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity, P403
[2] Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge.
[3] Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality, P11
[4] It is even more difficult to explain why these world leaders somehow during this conference seem to be able to cooperate so well, when they do not in the real world. Nor do we see any evidence of an orchestrated evil plan to control the world. But again, conspiracy thinkers do not seek evidence that may refute their theories.
[5] Dawkins, The God Delusion, P136, 143
Bibliography:
- David Deutsch. The Fabric of Reality (London: Pengiun Books, 2007)
- David Deutsch. The Beginning of Infinity: Explanations that Transform the World (London: Pengiun Books, 2012)
- Karl Popper. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2002)
- Richard Dawkins. The God Delusion (Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam, 2007)